From: "Yanchisin, Mark" <mark**At_Symbol_Here**EHS.UFL.EDU>
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] CSB to Vote on Final Report on April 2013 Fatal West Fertilizer Explosion
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 19:24:45 +0000
Reply-To: DCHAS-L <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU>
Message-ID: 3f866e6cab4f45d5b35714ace25e7488**At_Symbol_Here**

Hi all- as an addendum to the below- this also caused quite an uproar with Homeland Security and the CFATS (Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards) compliance program. It was a topic of conversation at the July 2015 Chemical Security Summit meetings. From what folks were saying, DHS did not have the plant registered in the CFATS program. DHS sounded like they were embarrassed they missed the site and that they didn't have it under scrutiny. Granted the CFATS program is for chemical security, but the Federal agencies are supposed to share info with each other, so someone somewhere somehow should have known about it and passed it along to all the other agencies. DHS admin said they had directed the field staff to be more active in finding these sites that did not voluntarily report their inventories.

Mark Yanchisin
Coordinator for Clinical and Laboratory Safety Programs
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Florida
POBå 112190 Bldg 179 Newell Dr.
Gainesville, Flå 32611-2190
O- 352-392-1591
F- 352-392-3647

"Just because you are in compliance doesn"t mean you are out of danger." Mike Rowe "Deadliest Catch"

-----Original Message-----
From: DCHAS-L Discussion List [mailto:dchas-l**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU] On Behalf Of Secretary, ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety
Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 1:43 PM
Subject: [DCHAS-L] CSB to Vote on Final Report on April 2013 Fatal West Fertilizer Explosion

Chemical Safety Board to Vote on Final Report on April 2013 Fatal West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire

Report Includes Recommendations for Hazard Awareness, Land Use Planning and Regulatory Oversight

Waco, Texas January 28, 2016 " Today, the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) will vote on its final report and safety recommendations on the April 17, 2013, West Fertilizer fire and explosion in West, Texas, which resulted in 15 fatalities, more than 260 injuries, and widespread community damage. The deadly fire and explosion occurred when about thirty tons of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) exploded after being heated by a fire at the storage and distribution facility.

The investigative team"s presentation will take place at a public meeting in Waco, Texas at 6 pm. The meeting will be available via webcast at At the meeting, the team will present its findings and recommendations as well as a 3D animation showing the events leading up to the incident.

CSB Chairperson Vanessa Allen Sutherland said, "This is one of the most destructive explosions ever investigated by the CSB. The CSB"s report found that limited regulatory oversight, poor hazard awareness, inadequate emergency planning, and the proximity of the facility to nearby homes and other buildings all led to the incident"s severity. The proposed safety recommendations address steps needed to help prevent a similar tragedy in the future."

The CSB determined that FGAN storage falls under a patchwork of U.S. safety standards and guidance " a patchwork that has many large gaps. These gaps include a lack of adequate federal, state or local oversight on FGAN storage and handling and the permitted use of combustible wooden buildings and wooden storage bins.

At the federal level, neither the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) adequately address FGAN in their existing regulation of highly hazardous chemicals. EPA does not cover FGAN under its Risk Management Program (RMP) rule, and OSHA does not cover FGAN under its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard or clearly identify coverage of FGAN in its Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard.

The CSB recommends to EPA that they cover FGAN under their RMP program and that OSHA cover FGAN under PSM or revise its Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard to clearly identify FGAN hazards" either option would address conditions that likely resulted in the West Fertilizer incident such as the safe storage of FGAN, construction materials, and fire suppression systems. Additionally, existing facilities should be required to phase in replacement of bins constructed of combustible material " such as wood " with noncombustible material.

CSB Lead Investigator Johnnie Banks said, "As a result of its findings, the CSB calls on both OSHA and EPA to strengthen their regulations to protect the public from hazards posed by fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate."

The CSB"s final report finds that there are more than 1,300 facilities across the country that store FGAN, forty of those are in Texas and nearly half are located within half a mile of a school, nursing home or hospital. Eighty-three percent of those facilities are located within a quarter mile of a residence.

The CSB is also making recommendations to the International Code Council to develop a chapter for fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate in the International Fire Code. This should include requirements for new and existing facilities storing ammonium nitrate to prevent the conditions that lead to the uncontrollable fire and explosion. CSB also found that lessons learned from previous FGAN incidents were not effectively communicated to emergency responders in other communities where the chemical is stored.

Lead Investigator Johnnie Banks said, "Overall, the CSB"s investigation found that training and reference materials did not adequately inform emergency responders about the potential for FGAN to detonate in a fire."

Therefore, CSB recommends that both career and volunteer firefighter associations in Texas establish minimum criteria for training and conduct outreach to firefighters and emergency response organizations across the state.

Chairperson Vanessa Allen Sutherland said, "CSB"s goal is to ensure that no one else be killed or injured due to a lack of awareness of hazardous chemicals in their communities. If adopted, the board"s recommendations can help prevent disasters like the one in West, Texas."

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