> > I can imagine that the EPA plays a similar role, i.e., engages experts in a discussion on pollutants and provides guidance on their use.

I don’t know that this has been an effective process for the EPA and her sister state agencies. This has been the starting assumption for many popular investigations into why polluting chemicals are found in the general environment or concentrated in specific location (I’m thinking here of such as use of asbestos, PCBs, and PFOAs among others). These investigations find that expert discussions in these topics are often driven by overly-optimistic motivated thinking. (See
https://safetyofwork.com/episodes/ep-101-when-should-incidents-cause-us-to-question-risk-assessments
for a discussion of this phenomenon in the nuclear industry.)

I believe that one factor in this motivated thinking is that the people who become experts in a specific chemical or technology acquire a vested interest in its use as they gain their expertise. This Intercept article in the headlines summary suggests to me that the lab community is experiencing a similar challenge with regard to the public's understanding and confidence in biosafety practices after the Covid pandemic. The confusion in the medical community about how to respond to the crisis has led to investigations such as this one. I believe that it is important for the laboratory safety community as a whole to be aware of this trend because the distinctions between chemical, biological and nuclear safety paradigms and practices are lost on the public.

I recognize that the media who are doing the investigations also have a vested interest in finding “shocking” surprises about the regulatory system. But “we were following expert guidance" has not been a convincing argument to the public on many chemical issues. This has led to federal and state legislative bodies passing laws related to specific chemicals and creating a disjointed regulatory scheme that can contradict itself and raise significant management challenges.

One resource that the Intercept article included is a reference to Dr. Peter Sandman’s work on risk communication. Specifically they point to his 2012 blog post on the biolab events described in the article and the public communication challenges that arose in responding to those events. Dr, Sandman's work explores the public’s reactions to technical risks and provides guidelines for communicating with non-experts about technical risks. Much of his work is available at
https://psandman.com/
and is a valuable resource for those of us working with the public on risks related to technical issues. A dated (1989) summary of the reesarch on this issue from the National Academy of Sciences can be found at
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/download/1189

- Ralph

Ralph Stuart, CIH, CCHO
ralph**At_Symbol_Here**rstuartcih.org

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