DCHAS-L Archives, May 1, 2023 - Re: [DCHAS-L] What we know − and don't know − about what caused UD's lab evacuation 2 weeks ago

When we conduct trainings at our campus, we emphasize the importance of reviewing and updating the risk assessment for an experiment when any changes, such as scaling up, are made. I don’t see any mention of this person talking to their supervisor about changing the scale of the experiment, but maybe that happened. If it didn’t happen, then that is definitely an opportunity for retraining. It is key for personnel to understand that scales changes can bring in new hazards.

ACS does have the Chemical Safety Library, which is a pretty easy way for people to look up possible reaction hazards of chemicals they are working with: https://safescience.cas.org/

I think this is a great tool and I am trying to find ways to make it more widely used on our campus.

ALEX HAGEN

Laboratory Safety Inspection Program Manager

Environmental Health & Safety Department

University of Washington

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**Princeton.EDU> On Behalf Of Daniel Kuespert
Sent: Saturday, April 29, 2023 6:43 AM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**Princeton.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] What we know − and don't know − about what caused UD's lab evacuation 2 weeks ago

This incident seems to have a common factor with several others like the "rainbow experiment” leading to flame-jetting and a synthesis that involved acidulating sodium azide (giving the exciting prospect of both poisoning the investigator and blowing him or her up). That factor is that the students (or instructors) didn’t know not to do that, despite the general hazard of the experiment being fairly widely known, at least to the chemical safety community.

I agree that it’s excellent that the student had the presence of mind to stop when something abnormal occurred. But I’d rather adopt an inherently-safer stance and figure out how to effectively communicate the risk of these common chemical blunders to those new to chemistry (and some who aren’t new but never happened to come across the hazard) so that they don’t start the experiment and place themselves and others at potential risk.

In particular, I wonder what ACS’s safety community can do to create a body of knowledge that can place a simple, unobtrusive “speed bump” in front of experiments like this.

Assembling a database of known incidents or hazardous combinations seems to me to be less useful here as a communication tool—no student is going to check through a list of incidents to see if they’re doing something hazardous—and a database would have to be very well indexed to make such hazards even findable.
Bretherick’s Handbook is well-indexed, but is $500, runs to thousands of pages, and is mainly a literature index that requires some expertise to use effectively.
Reactive chemical prediction programs like CHEETAH again require expertise to run and are unlikely to be checked.

Would it be useful if CHAS or CCS were to put together a series of Chemical Hazard Cards briefly explaining some of these common issues, maybe in a trading-card size format? I don’t think we can solve all reactive chemicals problems without defining and providing a full curriculum on the topic, and then it requires expensive resources not available to chemists at places like 2-year colleges and primarily undergraduate institutions. A printed or downloadable deck of cards could be used directly to educate students on the biggest “don’t do’s”, as fodder for a weekly safety moment, or in other ways that would at least help us move the needle on these incidents.

We’ve tried fact sheets and videos on the Rainbow Demo, and the incidents continue. I chalk this up to poor penetration of ACS safety materials into state-controlled K-12 school science programs—I know that the Division of Chemical Education’s safety committee has difficulty even getting phone calls returned. But at the undergrad and graduate level, ACS’s safety materials are respected and increasingly turned to as accepted guidance—maybe we could have some impact there.

Opinions?

Regards,

Dan

-------------------------------------------------
Daniel Kuespert, PhD, CSP
Member, American Chemical Society (ACS)
Member, ACS Division of Chemical Health & Safety (CHAS)
Chair, CHAS 2023
Member, ACS Committee on Chemical Safety, 2023-2025
CHAS Fellow

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On Apr 27, 2023, at 10:48, Calitree, Brandon <bdc**At_Symbol_Here**UDEL.EDU> wrote:

Hi All,

It's been a while since this incident happened, but I wanted to provide information about it and maybe something you can discuss on your campus.

--

On Wednesday, February 8, 2023, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Environmental Health & Safety (EHS) received a phone call from Lammot du Pont Laboratory (LDL) personnel reporting the accidental creation of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) by a graduate student. EHS employees responded for an initial assessment. Upon arrival, EHS was informed that the student was working with a mixture of Trifluoroacetic Acid, Acetone, and Hydrogen Peroxide. The experiment had been conducted on a smaller scale two days prior, affording two products, one expected and one unexpected, as identified via Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) spectroscopy. The unexpected product was of interest, and the reaction was scaled to produce more of this material. While filtering the larger-scale product, the student observed a "pop" and immediately stopped work to consult the PI. They determined from further review of the NMR spectra that the reaction had produced Triacetone Triperoxide, TATP.

EHS contacted a Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) Hazmat and the State's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit. EOD units and additional first responder assets were dispatched to the campus, consisting of UD Police and several State and Federal agencies. Out of an abundance of caution and given the volatile nature and quantity (30 grams) of TATP, buildings in immediate proximity were evacuated. Subsequently, given the need to neutralize the material on the South Center Green, buildings within the proximity were evacuated.

EOD representatives, supported by EHS personnel, decided the safest manner to neutralize the TATP was to transport it from LDL to the South Center Green using a State Police robot. A 2' x 2' trench was created in the grass under the instruction of EOD personnel. The robot delivered the materials, and an EOD constructed charge to the trench to safely detonate the TATP. At 5:41 p.m., the charge successfully detonated the TATP in the trench without incident. EHS and UDPD subsequently secured each location. An "all clear" was transmitted at approximately 6:48 p.m.

--

I must say that I am so proud of the graduate student for recognizing this mistake, STOPPING, and asking for help. Over the past few years, our EHS team has focused on developing a collaborative relationship with our researchers and breaking down the stigma that we are laboratory police. I believe this effort allowed the student and faculty member to feel comfortable reaching out to EHS and not handling the situation alone.

We still have a lot of work to do, and I'm hoping this information can be helpful on your campus; nearly every lab has hydrogen peroxide and acetone. As a start, remind your groups about incompatible mixtures!

Thank you,

Brandon

Brandon D. Calitree, Ph.D., MBA

Associate Director | Chemical Hygiene Officer

University of Delaware

Environmental Health & Safety

Chemical Safety Moments

-----Original Message-----
From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**Princeton.EDU> On Behalf Of Ralph Stuart
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2023 7:53 AM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**Princeton.EDU
Subject: [DCHAS-L] What we know − and don't know − about what caused UD's lab evacuation 2 weeks ago

https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2023/02/24/university-delaware-lab-evacuation-questions-explosive-chemical/69911628007/

What we know − and don't know − about what caused UD's lab evacuation 2 weeks ago

Two weeks after a "safety-related incident" in the University of Delaware's Lammot du Pont Laboratory led to the evacuation of six buildings and a police-led "controlled detonation" on The Green in Newark, UD officials have provided an update on the incident with slightly more information.

However, details about what exactly led to this incident and what was occurring at the lab remain unknown to the public.

Here's what we can answer − and what we can’t.

What do we know about what happened?

Researchers in the Lammot du Pont Laboratory "inadvertently produced a small amount of a shock-sensitive explosive chemical" on Feb. 8, according to the university.Delaware State Police's explosive ordnance disposal unit removed the chemicals from the lab on Wednesday and took them to a "safe location" on the South Green for a "controlled detonation" at 5:45 p.m. There were no reported injuries, and all evacuated buildings were reopened for classes the following day.

(more at URL above)

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