From: NEAL LANGERMAN <neal**At_Symbol_Here**CHEMICAL-SAFETY.COM>
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 08:21:05 -0700
Reply-To: neal**At_Symbol_Here**CHEMICAL-SAFETY.COM
Message-ID: 0a6701d551ea$be10b220$3a321660$**At_Symbol_Here**chemical-safety.com
In-Reply-To <007201d551e9$418913b0$c49b3b10$**At_Symbol_Here**comcast.net>


Eugene

All the medical hyperbaric chambers I have seen do operate at 1 ATA, but 60 - 100% O2 is delivered to the PT via tight-fitting face mask and exhausted overboard. All the chambers have O2 sensors and procedures for increasing air flow through rates if the O2 concentration exceeds a set-point, usually 24%.

 

Neal

 

 

 

Reply from:

NEAL LANGERMAN

(619) 990-4908

 

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU> On Behalf Of Eugene Ngai
Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2019 8:10 AM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

 

Yaritza

 

Thank you. I was not aware of this incident that happened 6 years before the Apollo1 fire. I agree that the hazards of an O2 enriched atmosphere is significant. Since a human cannot breath O2 at 1 atm for extended periods, the Apollo 1 capsule was at approx. 1/3 atm. This vacuum created a pressure differential that made it difficult to open the door until the pressure was equalized. Sounds like this was the same problem in the Russian case.

 

We are now seeing fatal accidents with O2 hyperbaric chambers used for treating injuries. These operate at pressures above 1 atm. In an incident it can take 5 minutes or more to release the pressure and open the chamber.

 

 

Eugene Ngai

Chemically Speaking LLC

www.chemicallyspeakingllc.com

 

 

 

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU> On Behalf Of Yaritza Brinker
Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2019 10:31 AM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

 

Actually, the Russians used an oxygen rich atmosphere at the beginning of their program and switched to a different atmosphere (presumably air) after Bondarenko's death in 1961. Some accounts describe it as pure O2 and some as >50%, but most describe it as high O2.

 

Although the details of the incidents are different, both incidents occurred in a sealed capsule, in an oxygen rich atmosphere, and neither were able to evacuate due to the capsule design. I think the similarities make this an interesting case study regarding the importance of sharing information to prevent future disasters.

 

There's an article in NASA's archives that describes multiple cosmonaut accidents. The account for this particular one starts on page 3 https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/chapter-10--dead-cosmonauts.pdf

 

Thank you,

 

Yaritza Brinker

260.827.5402

 

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU> On Behalf Of Eugene Ngai
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2019 5:56 PM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

 

** External Email **

I don't think they were the same event. To save weight the US spacecrafts Mercury, Gemini and Apollo used pure oxygen at a reduced pressure. That fire burned materials that are not flammable in air some of which released large amounts of HF. That is why NASA conducted numerous oxygen compatibility studies afterward. The Russians used regular air

 

 

Eugene Ngai

Chemically Speaking LLC

www.chemicallyspeakingllc.com

 

 

 

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU> On Behalf Of Yaritza Brinker
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2019 5:45 PM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

 

So long as you are going to talk about lack of sharing information-

 

Had the death of cosmonaut Valentin Bondarenko been publicized rather than hidden behind the iron courtain, then astronauts Grissom, White, and Chaffee would have not died in the Apollo 1 fire.

 

Thank you,

 

Yaritza Brinker

260.827.5402

 

From: ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety <DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU> On Behalf Of Carmen Nitsche
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2019 4:40 PM
To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**PRINCETON.EDU
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

 

** External Email **

to your point about embarrassment - we need to be supportive of all those folks who get up and share these important incidents to help us stay safe.  That is why we should give tremendous credit to both Barry Sharpless and Ian Tonks  -  both of whom shared in great detail their experiences of frightening lab accidents on the recent C&EN SteroChemistry podcast ( https://cen.acs.org/safety/Podcast-Lessons-learned-lab-safety/97/i30 ) 

 

What especially came out of Ian's story, which he classified as frustrating, but I would almost classify as unethical, was that once he published the information in a C&ENews safety letter he received several notes from folks who said, "...of yeah, that has happened to me too"  - Where were they when it might have made a difference!!!

 

I will be discussing safety and ethics at the CHAS session San Diego  - and that is precisely the topic I want to dwell on - not alerting your friends, coworkers and colleagues. and neighbors should be considered unethical, and far outweigh any personal discomfort and fear.. Of course that response is not surprising -  how often do we finger point at the last poor soul who suffers the brunt of the accident when in many, many cases  you will actually find several points of failure, including systemic issues that no one individual can fix, or might even fully recognize.

 

Building a strong safety culture is hard. I value all the support we have received from this community with the CSL - because  identifying the issue, and talking about it, is how we will start to move the needle on better safety culture..  

 

Hope to see many of you in San Diego!  --Carmen

 

 

 

.    

 

 

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/KS56tJtlcCfEeVR9iZ1F_-v4JLYsGuM727lJd3iKIXq26CSFNrHGBYdjwXtYiRIbHLuSKmn8jcAidE-14hmxN30cbRvvAMUYFINmt4aoHlbwYtU9RPHzQHsJ81MUT1wA0kA4IvzV

 

 

 

 

Carmen Nitsche

Business Development Consultant

https://www.pistoiaalliance.org

https://ip3.pistoiaalliance.org/

Mobile: 1 (510) 589 3355

Linkedin, Twitter

 

 



https://tracking.cirrusinsight.com/track?guid=6c454917-0203-425c-a504-963ca629f438&userid=005i0000000RhyBAAS&platform=gmail&orgid=00Di0000000KTikEAG

 

On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 4:00 PM <lhlatimer**At_Symbol_Here**mindspring.com> wrote:

Thanks, Carmen.  A very worthwhile project that I hope is getting traction despite the embarrassment many feel at doing a reaction poorly and then owning up to it, even if you found something interesting or useful in analyzing why.

 

Thanks again!

 

Lee

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Carmen Nitsche
Sent: Aug 12, 2019 12:45 PM
To:
lhlatimer**At_Symbol_Here**mindspring.com, ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety
Cc: Pistoia , Mark Manfredi , CSL Admins
Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] New Article

Lee-- thank you so much for alerting us to this article.  I am pleased to note that my colleagues have just today put three entries into the Pistoia Alliance Chemical Safety Library database coming from this paper. 

 

 The CSL database collects reactions gone wrong in a reusable format (database includes GHS codes, InChI, CAS#, Description of incident, etc).  The CSL is available as a CSV file to anyone who requests it (send email requests for the CSL .csv file to csladmin**At_Symbol_Here**pistoiaalliance.org)    We also post all the entries to PubChem on a regular basis (appear in section  Section 12.8.3.1 of the compound summaries)

 

I should also note that we continue to solicit new entries to the database, for any reactions gone wrong, or near miss reaction events from which we can all learn.    If you have an incident you would like included, please fill out this simple GoogleForm and we will be in touch if we have any questions.    (your name and institution  will not appear in the public database). 

 

Thanks again,  --Carmen

 

 

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/KS56tJtlcCfEeVR9iZ1F_-v4JLYsGuM727lJd3iKIXq26CSFNrHGBYdjwXtYiRIbHLuSKmn8jcAidE-14hmxN30cbRvvAMUYFINmt4aoHlbwYtU9RPHzQHsJ81MUT1wA0kA4IvzV

 

 

 

 

Carmen Nitsche

Business Development Consultant

https://www.pistoiaalliance.org

https://ip3.pistoiaalliance.org/

Mobile: 1 (510) 589 3355

Linkedin, Twitter

 

 



https://tracking.cirrusinsight.com/track?guid=cc9f87e3-24a6-42aa-b031-4b4dda587b9c&userid=005i0000000RhyBAAS&platform=gmail&orgid=00Di0000000KTikEAG

 

On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 4:27 PM <lhlatimer**At_Symbol_Here**mindspring.com> wrote:

All,

 

For those working with synthetic chemists in research and in process/scale-up, an article out today in ASAP Alerts for Organic Process Research and Development (an ACS journal) should be of critical interest to them, regardless of their sense of glory or career situation.  I've copied the reference and abstract below.  The subject is explosion potential of sodium hydride use in polar parotid solvents (i.e. DMSO, DMF and DMA).  

 

This, by the way, is a journal that has safety quite frequently as a topic.

 

Best,

 

Lee

 

Qiang Yang, David E. Ejeh, et al.

 

Abstract

 

The hazards associated with the thermal decomposition of chemically incompatible sodium hydride solvent matrices are known, with reports from the 1960s detailing the inherent instability of NaH/dimethyl sulfoxide, NaH/N,N-dimethylformamide, and NaH/N,N-dimethylacetamide mixtures. However, these hazards remain underappreciated and undercommunicated, likely as a consequence of the widespread use of these NaH/solvent matrices in synthetic chemistry. We report herein detailed investigations into the thermal stability of these mixtures and studies of the formation of gaseous products from their thermal decomposition. We expect this contribution to promote awareness of these hazards within the wider scientific community, encourage scientists to identify and pursue safer alternatives, and most importantly, help to prevent incidents associated with these reactive mixtures.

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