I agree. If federal agencies can require institutional review committees for recombinant materials, research involving animals and humans and some radioactive materials, why not chemical safety? Dennis Nolan Assistant Director The University of Texas at Austin -----Original Message----- From: DCHAS-L Discussion List [mailto:dchas-l**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU] On Behalf Of Ken Kretchman Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 3:05 PM To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] CSB Texas Tech Case Study I also was a bit disappointed that the recommendation for more of an emphasis on appropriate hazard reviews by granting agencies did not make it to the final recommendations, as appropriately pointed out by one of the callers. On the topic of lack of published incidents, which is a topic that has come up before, here is the link to the AIHA website that attempts to address this. There are other compilations like this, it is only one, and does not include identifying information of the site where incident occurred. AIHA has managed to bury their committee information so if you find this useful you may want to bookmark. http://www.aiha.org/insideaiha/volunteergroups/labHandScommittee/Pages/LaboratorySafetyIncidents.aspx thanks, Ken Kenneth Kretchman, CSP, CIH Director, Environmental Health and Safety NC State University Raleigh, NC 27695-8007 919-515-6860 (p) 919-515-6307 (f) ken_kretchman**At_Symbol_Here**ncsu.edu "Robin M. Izzo"
10/19/2011 2:58 PM >>> Honestly, I found the entire presentation disappointing. The joint presentation by the CSB and Texas Tech at the CSHEMA conference in July was excellent and provided some excellent points to ponder that were absent from this webinar. The issues regarding policies, structure, training, etc all needing to work together to create a positive safety culture were very well stated. As far as reporting structures, I hope that the CSB (or rather, the ACS, as it seems) doesn't go out and suggest that every college and university change their structure. The issue is not necessarily who EHS reports to, it's about the relationship that EHS has with the research side of the house. For example, at Princeton, the reporting structure is nearly exactly the same as Texas Tech's structure at the time of their incident. However, the Dean for Research, the Dean of the Faculty, the Provost and even the president of the University are partners in lab safety. We have an escalation process in place that goes from the laboratory worker to the PI to the department chair to the Dean for Research. The Dean for Research is also the chair of the University Research Board, which grants PI status, among other things. As needed, we will bring in the Dean of Faculty (for faculty performance issues), the Dean of the Graduate School (for graduate student issues), etc. If we changed our structure to what was proposed, then what about our non-laboratory issues? What about general safety, ergonomics, fire safety, etc? How does that fit in? I also felt that they were too focused on regulation. What does it matter that the OSHA lab standard defines "particularly hazardous substances" based only on toxicity? It still says we have to have a strong safety program and it refers to Prudent Practices. Last I checked, Prudent Practices had plenty of emphasis on physical hazards. As for training, the general laboratory safety training that our EHS provides touches on explosives, reactive materials, and other unusual hazards, but does not get into specifics. Specifics come from other resources and procedures, as well as in-lab training. Has CSB already had discussions with ACS about the charge they have given? If so, who or what group has been asked to do this? Robin M. Izzo, M.S. Associate Director, EHS Princeton University 609-258-6259 (office) How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg? Four. Calling it a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg. ~ Abraham Lincoln -----Original Message----- From: DCHAS-L Discussion List [mailto:dchas-l**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU] On Behalf Of Ernest Lippert Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 2:04 PM To: DCHAS-L**At_Symbol_Here**MED.CORNELL.EDU Subject: Re: [DCHAS-L] CSB Texas Tech Case Study To All, What is obviously lacking, in addition to effective communication, is common sense. A point I make in safety training is: "Careful consideration must be given to every operation where the risk of injury may occur. Always, education, information, and common sense should dictate the consequentially proper procedures", (paraphrased from Jay A. Young). Regards, Ernest Lippert On Wed, Oct 19, 2011 at 1:35 PM, Erik A. Talley wrote: Your Friend, Erik Talley, has recommended the following page on CSB Startup NET Title: CSB Texas Tech Case Study URL: http://www.csb.gov/newsroom/detail.aspx?nid=386 ---------- NOTE: If your e-mail account doesn't automatically turn the URL above into a link, you can copy and paste it into your browser.
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